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Abstract. Formal modeling of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is hard,
because they pose the double challenge of combined discrete-continous
dynamics and concurrent behavior. Existing formal specification and ver-
ification languages for CPS are designed on top of their underlying proof
search technology. They lack high-level structuring elements. In addi-
tion, they are not or not efficiently executable. This makes formal CPS
models hard to understand and to validate, hence impairs their usability.
Instead, we suggest to model CPS in an Active Objects (AO) language
designed for concise, intuitive modeling of concurrent systems. To this
end, we extend the AO language ABS and its runtime environment with
Hybrid Active Objects (HAO). CPS models and requirements formal-
ized in HAO must follow certain communication patterns that permit
automatic translation into differential dynamic logic, a sequential hy-
brid program logic. Verification is achieved by discharging the resulting
formulas with the theorem prover KeYmaera X. We demonstrate the
practicality of our approach with case studies.
1 Introduction
Formal modeling of cyber-physical systems (CPS) poses a double challenge: first,
their hybrid nature, with both continuous physical dynamics and complex com-
putations in discrete time steps. Second, their concurrent nature: distributed,
active components (sensors, actuators, controllers) execute simultaneously and
communicate asynchronously. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to get
models of CPS right. But to be useful in practice, a formal modeling language
must support validation [24], i.e. to ensure that the model correctly captures a
system and its requirements. Existing modeling languages for CPS, however, are
designed for verification: to prove that a formal model satisfies formal properties.
Examples include hybrid automata [2], hybrid process algebra [11], and logics
for hybrid programs [26]. Models written in these languages are hard to read,
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because they are expressed in terms of the underlying verification technology:
automata, algebras, formulas. They lack high-level structuring elements such
as types, scopes, methods, complex commands, futures, etc. In addition, these
languages are not or not efficiently executable, a crucial aspect of validation.
We make a proposal to address the “usability gap” in modeling CPS while
retaining the capability to formally verify properties of models. Our starting
point is the Active Objects [8] language ABS (for: Abstract Behavioral Speci-
fication) [17]. It is an efficiently executable language, designed to model asyn-
chronous, concurrent systems. ABS was used to model complex, real-world sys-
tems for cloud processing [1], virtualized services [18], data processing [21], and
railway operations [19]. It is designed for verifiability and has associated analysis
and verification tools [32], but it lacks the capability to model hybrid systems.
That is offered by our suggested Hybrid ABS (HABS) language extension, gener-
alizing Active Objects to Hybrid Active Objects (HAO): Active Objects extended
with continuous dynamics. However, we do not endeavor to extend the existing
verification system of ABS [12] to handle HAO. For once, this is a highly com-
plex task; second, an expressive hybrid verification logic is available as differential
dynamic logic (dL) [28,29,30], implemented in the KeYmaera X system [13].
Our approach is based on translation from HABS to dL: Hybrid models
are developed and debugged in HABS—whose runtime environment is extended
to handle HAO—and then formally verified against a safety property in KeY-
maera X. Fig. 1 illustrates this: Verification ensures that all HAO created to
satisfy a given precondition fulfill a given object invariant. An optional main
block can be used to initialize a system model. This allows to verify concrete
scenarios. Simulation of HABS models features a visualization component that
produces graphs showing how the value of object fields changes over time.
HABS Model
Hybrid Class Main Block-proof obligations
KeYmaera X
Erlang code
Verification Simulation
Executable +
maxima calls
Modeling
Fig. 1. Overview over HABS.
KeYmaera X does not yet support QdL [27] for distributed hybrid systems
and its component-based techniques [25] are subject to strict interaction require-
ments. We solve this by identifying an interaction pattern for communication
that we impose on HABS. It is general enough to permit intuitive and concise
modeling of relevant case studies. The advantage of the pattern-based approach
is that one can decompose the HABS verification problem into a set of indepen-
dent sequential dL problems for each hybrid class. In this sense, verification is
compositional.
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The paper is structured as follows. Sect. 2 provides background on dL. Sect. 3
gives syntax and semantics of HABS, illustrated with water tank models. Sect. 4
describes verification, Sect. 5 compilation and simulation. Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Background: Differential Dynamic Logic
We briefly review differential dynamic logic (dL) [29,30] as implemented in the
interactive theorem prover KeYmaera X [13]. Differential dynamic logic expresses
the combined discrete and continuous dynamics of hybrid systems in a sequen-
tial imperative programming language called hybrid programs. Its syntax and
informal semantics are in Table 1.
Table 1. Hybrid programs in dL
Program Informal semantics
?ϕ Test whether formula ϕ is true, abort if false
x := θ Assign value of term θ to variable x
x := ∗ Assign any (real) value to variable x
{x′ = θ&H} Evolve ODE x′ = θ for any duration t≥0
with evolution domain constraint H true throughout
α;β Run α followed by β on resulting state(s)
α ∪ β Run either α or β non-deterministically
α∗ Repeat α n times, for any n ∈ N
Hybrid programs provide the usual discrete statements assignment (x := θ),
non-deterministic assignment (x := ∗), test (?ϕ), non-deterministic choice (α∪β),
sequential composition (α;β), and non-deterministic repetition (α∗). A typ-
ical modeling pattern combines non-deterministic assignment and test (e.g.,
“x := ∗; ?H”) to choose any value subject to a Boolean constraint H. Stan-
dard control structures are expressible, for example: (i) if H then α else β ≡
(?H;α) ∪ (?¬H;β), (ii) if H then α ≡ (?H;α) ∪ (?¬H), (iii) while (H) α ≡
(?H;α)
∗
; ?¬H.
For continuous dynamics, the notation {x′ = θ&H} represents an ordinary
differential equation (ODE) system (derivative x′ in time) of the form x′1 = θ1,
. . . , x′n = θn. Any behavior described by the ODE stays inside the evolution
domain H, i.e. the ODE is followed for a non-deterministic, non-negative period
of time, but stops before H becomes false. For example, a basic model of the
water level x in a tank draining with flow−f is given by the ODE {x′ = −f &x ≥
0}, where the evolution domain constraint x ≥ 0 means the tank will not drain
to negative water levels. With a careful modeling pattern, continuous behavior
can be governed by H so that one can react to events, but it is not otherwise
restricted or influenced: The pattern {x′ = θ&H}∪{x′ = θ& H˜} permits control
intervention to achieve different behavior triggered by an event. H˜ is the weak
complement of H: they share exactly their boundary from which both behaviors
are possible. For example, H ≡ x ≤ 0, H˜ ≡ x ≥ 0.
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The dL-formulas ϕ, ψ relevant for this paper are propositional logic operators
ϕ∧ψ, ϕ∨ψ, ϕ→ ψ, ¬ϕ and comparison expressions θ ∼ η, where ∼ ∈{<, ≤, =
, 6=, ≥, >} and θ, η are real-valued terms over {+, −, · , /}. In addition, there
is the dL modal operator [α]ϕ. The dL-formula [α]ϕ is true iff ϕ holds in all
states reachable by program α. The formal semantics of dL [29,30] is a Kripke
semantics in which the states of the Kripke model are the states of the hybrid
system. The semantics of a hybrid program α is a relation JαK between its initial
and final states. Specifically, ν |= [α]ϕ iff ω |= ϕ for all states (ν, ω) ∈ JαK, so all
runs of α from ν are safe relative to ϕ.
3 Hybrid Active Objects
Active Objects [8] are strongly encapsulated objects that realize actor-based
concurrency [15] with futures [7] and cooperative scheduling: Active Objects
communicate via asynchronous method calls. On the caller side of a method
invocation each time a future is generated as a handle to the call’s result once
it is available. The caller may synchronize on that future, i.e. suspend and wait
until it is resolved. At most one process is running on an Active Object at any
time. It only suspends when it encounters the synchronization statement await
on an unresolved future or a false Boolean condition. Once the guard becomes
true, the process may be re-scheduled. All fields are strictly object-private.
Hybrid Active Objects (HAO) extend Active Objects with continuous behav-
ior, expressed by ODE over “physical” fields. These change their value following
their ODE whenever time passes, even when no process is active.
/∗@ requires 4 < inVal & inVal < 9 @∗/
class CSingleTank(Real inVal) {
/∗@ invariant 3 <= level & level <= 10 @∗/
physical {
Real level = inVal : level’ = drain;
Real drain = -1/2 : drain’ = 0;
}
Unit run() { this!ctrl(); }
Unit ctrl() {
await diff (level <= 3 & drain <= 0)
| (level >= 10 & drain >= 0);
if (level <= 3) drain = 1/2;
else drain = -1/2;
this.ctrl();
}
}
time in seconds
level
drain
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 0  50  100  150  200
Fig. 2. A water tank as a Hybrid Active Object and a simulation output.
Example 1. Fig. 2 shows on the left an HAO model of a water tank that either
fills with 12 l/sec or is drained with the same speed. Method ctrl() realizes a
control loop that sets the drain field to switch between those states so that the
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level stays between 3l and 10l. Fields level, drain are physical. Their initial value
and governing ODE is declared in the physical section. The controller suspends
until level <= 3 | level >= 10 holds, i.e. until the water level reaches the upper
or lower limit. Depending on which is the case, it changes the state and calls
itself recursively.
The JML style comments provide an assumption on the initial state and the
safety condition that in this case can be proven: if the initial level is between 4l
and 9l, then it always stays between 3l and 10l. Before one attempts to formally
verify this property one typically wants to run some tests to see whether it
behaves as intended. Our HABS implementation allows to simulate and visualize
an HAO model. For example, the graph in Fig. 2 on the right shows the behavior
of a CSingleTank object instantiated with inVal = 5. In Sec. 4 we show how the
class is translated into dL and prove the safety condition in KeYmaera X for
any object created with a parameter that satisfies the precondition.
3.1 Hybrid ABS
We formally define the Hybrid Abstract Behavioral Specification (HABS) lan-
guage based on ABS [17]. The syntax is in Fig. 3. With e we denote standard
expressions over fields f, variables v and operators |, &, >=, <=, +, -, *, /. Types T
are all interface names and Real, Unit. HABS uses futures implicitly, no explicit
future types need to be declared.
A program contains a main method, interfaces, classes. Interfaces are stan-
dard, the main method contains a list of object creations. Classes can have pa-
rameters, these are fields being initialized during object creation. Classes have
an optional physical block that declares ODEs over physical fields. Classes can
have further field declarations and declare three different kinds of methods:
– Controllers, starting with an await statement and ending with a recursive
call.
– Ports, used to communicate with other objects.
– A mandatory Unit run() method that only calls controllers. It is started
upon object creation.
Controller methods realize control loops. They may call port methods of
other objects in each round after the initial await suspension statement. Port
methods neither suspend nor call other methods. The first rule in the grammar
for Port declares out-port, the second in-port methods. An out-port returns a
field, an in-port copies its parameter into a field.
There are two kinds of guards: diff e suspends until the expression e evaluates
to true, duration(e1,e2) suspends between e1 and e2 time units. The call e.m is
shorthand for an asynchronous call directly followed by synchronization on its
future. The call e!m is asynchronous and this.m is a standard internal synchronous
call. Each HABS program is well-typed according to [6,17] plus: (i) the method
calls at the end of controllers implement direct recursion; (ii) the structure of
controllers is to read from out-ports of other objects into local fields, followed by
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Prgm ::= ID CD Main ID ::= interface I
[
extends I
] {MS} Program, Interfaces
CD ::= class C
[
implements I
] [
(T v)
] {Phys? FD Ctrl Port Run} Classes
Main ::= {I v = new C(e)} FD ::= T v = e Main, Fields
Phys ::= physical {DED} DED ::= Real v = e : de de ::= e | e’ Physical Block
MS ::= T m(T v) Port ::= MS {return f;} | MS {f = v;} Signature, Ports
Ctrl ::= MS {sa; s; this.m();} Run ::= Unit run() {sc} Controllers, Run
sa ::= await duration(e,e) | await diff e sc ::= e!m(e) | sc;sc Suspension, Calls
s ::= [T] v = e | v = e | f = e.m() | e!m(f) Atomic Statements
| while (e) {s} | if (e) {s} [else {s}] | s;s Control Flow
Fig. 3. Syntax of HABS
computation, followed by writing into in-ports of other objects. By convention
we let all controller method names start with ctrl, all in-ports with in and all
out-ports with out.
1 interface Tank {
2 /∗ requires −1/2 <= newD <= 1/2; ∗/
3 Unit inDrain(Real newD);
4 /∗ ensures 3 <= outLevel <= 10; ∗/
5 Real outLevel();
6 }
7 class Tank(Real inVal) implements Tank {
8 physical {
9 Real level = inVal : level’ = drain;
10 Real drain = -1/2 : drain’ = 0;
11 }
12 Unit run() { }
13 /∗ requires newD > 0 −> level <= 9.5 ∗/
14 /∗ requires newD < 0 −> level >= 3.5 ∗/
15 /∗ timed requires inDrain < 1 ∗/
16 Unit inDrain(Real newD) { drain = newD; }
17 Real outLevel() { return level; }
18 }
19 /∗ requires 0 < tick < 1 ∗/
20 class FlowCtrl(Tank t, Real tick){
21
22 /∗ invariant drain > 0 −> level <= 9.5
23 & drain < 0 −> level >= 3.5 ∗/
24 Real drain = 1/2;
25 Real level = 0;
26
27 Unit run() { this!ctrlFlow(); }
28 Unit ctrlFlow() {
29 await duration(tick,tick);
30 level = t.outLevel();
31 if (level <= 3.5) drain = 1/2;
32 if (level >= 9.5) drain = -1/2;
33 t!inDrain(drain);
34 this.ctrlFlow();
35 }
36 }
Fig. 4. A water tank modeled as two Hybrid Active Objects. Invariant and precondition
of Tank are as in Fig. 2.
Example 2. Fig. 4 shows a water tank realized by two objects: a controller
FlowCtrl and the tank itself Tank. The Tank has an in-port inDrain and an
out-port method outPort. It has no controller, the run method is empty.
The controller’s fields drain, level are its local copies of the state of the tank.
The controller method first updates level, decides on the state of drain, then
pushes the (possibly changed) state of drain to the tank. No time passes in the
controller after suspension which ensures that the copied fields are synchronized
at the end of the round. As the Tank’s fields are not directly accessible to the
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FlowCtrl instance it is not possible to wait on the Tank’s level. Instead, every
tick seconds the controller is run.
The Tank interface specification declares an input requirement and a guaran-
tee on returned values. The precondition of the inDrain method specification is
a constraint on the input parameter. The timed_requires clause stipulates that
the inDrain method must be called at least once per second.
3.2 Semantics of HABS
HABS extends the SOS semantics for Timed ABS [6] and only requires three
small extensions: (i) include the physical behavior in the object state; (ii) deter-
mine whether a differential guard holds and, if not, when it will at the earliest;
(iii) update the state whenever time passes. These affect only expression evalu-
ation and auxiliary functions. No new SOS rule in addition to [6] is needed.
States. The state of an object has two parts: (i) a store σ, that maps (physical
and non-physical) fields to values and the variables of the active process to values,
and (ii) F , the set of solutions of the ODE in its physical block. A solution f
is a function from time to a store which only contains the physical fields. The
state and the solutions are connected: for each f ∈ F and each physical field f
the following holds: f(0)(f) = σ(f).
Semantics of Differential Guards. The semantics of an await g statement is to
suspend until the guard holds, i.e. until JgKFσ evaluates to true. A duration guard
duration(e1,e2) evaluates to true if Je1KFσ ≤ 0. Defining this extended timed
semantics requires two operations on guards: An extension of the evaluation
function that returns true if the guard holds and the maximal time elapse mteFσ
returning the time t that may maximally elapse without the guard evaluating to
true, or ∞ if this is never the case. We start with the semantics of expressions
containing physical fields.
Definition 1 (Semantics of Expressions with Physical Fields). Let F be
the set of solutions of an object o. Given a state σ of o, we can check whether
F is a model of an expression e at time t. Let fp be a physical field and fd a
discrete field of o. The semantics of fields fp, fd, unary operators !, - and binary
operators ∼∈ {|, &, >=, <=, +, -, *, /} is defined as follows:
JfpKF,tσ = {v if ∀f ∈ F.v = f(t)(fp)∞ otherwise JfdKF,tσ = σ(fd)J-eKF,tσ = −JeKF,tσ J!eKF,tσ = ¬JeKF,tσ Je ∼ e’KF,tσ = JeKF,tσ ∼ Je’KF,tσ
Outside differential guards, only the evaluation in the initial state JvcKF,0σ
is needed and this expression is never ∞. Next we define mte(e): the maximal
time that may elapse without missing an event is the minimal time needed by
the system to evolve into a state where the guard holds. This yields also the
semantics of the guard itself. We identify J·KFσ with J·KF,0σ .
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Definition 2 (Semantics of Differential Guards). Let F be the set of solu-
tions of object o in state σ. Then we define:
mteFσ (diff e) = argmin
t≥0
(JeKF,tσ = true)
A differential guard is evaluated to true if no time advance is needed:Jdiff eKF,0σ = true ⇐⇒ mteFσ (diff e) = 0
If e contains no continuous variable then the differential guard semantics and
the evaluation of expressions in Def. 1 coincides with condition synchronization
and expression evaluation in the standard ABS semantics [17].
Time Advance. The characteristic feature of hybrid objects is that their (phys-
ical) state changes when time advances, even when no process is active. This
is expressed in the semantics by a function adv(σ, t) which takes a state σ, a
duration t, and advances σ by t time units:
adv(σ, t)(f) =
{
σ(f) if f is not physical
v if ∀f ∈ F. v = f(t)(f)
Hence, for non-hybrid Active Objects adv(σ, t) = σ. Here the function is only
needed to modify the process pool of an object for scheduling, not its state, and
used exactly as in [6].
4 Verification
4.1 Overview
With verification we mean essentially that an HAO satisfies its class invariant
provided that the constraints expressed in the preconditions are met. We make
this precise now. A class specification is a tuple (inv, pre,TReq,Req,Ens), where
inv is the class invariant, a dL formula over the fields and parameters of the class
and pre is its precondition, a dL formula over the class parameters. TReq is the
set of timed preconditions for in-port methods: dL formulas over a dedicated
program variable with the method’s name. Req is the set of preconditions for
in-port methods: dL formulas over fields and the parameter of the methods. Ens
is the set of postconditions for out-port methods: dL formulas over a dedicated
program variable with the method’s name.
To verify a class, it is translated into a dL-formula that expresses relative
safety at any point in time and has the following form:
ϕC ≡ preconditionC →
[
(codeC; plantC)
∗]
safetyC (1)
The preconditionC is composed of pre and restrictions on time and tick
variables. As usual in controller verification, the program consists of a control
part codeC, followed by the evolution of the continuous behavior plantC. The
safetyC condition must hold after an arbitrary number of iterations. It contains
inv, preconditions of in-port methods of referred objects, and postconditions
of own out-port methods. The following translation of a HABS class and its
specification defines formally how the placeholders are composed.
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trans(f) ≡ f where f is the dL program variable representing f
trans(v) ≡ v where v is the dL program variable representing v
trans(e1 op e2) ≡ trans(e1) op trans(e2)
trans(if(e){s}[else {s}]) ≡ if (trans(e)) then trans(s)[else trans(s)]
trans(while(e){s}) ≡ while(trans(e))trans(s) trans(s1;s2) = trans(s1);trans(s2)
trans([T] v = e) ≡ trans(v) := trans(e) trans(f = e) ≡ trans(f) := trans(e)
trans(e!m()) ≡ ?true trans(f = e.m()) ≡ trans(f) := ∗;?ϕm
where ϕm is the postcondition of m, with the method name replaced by trans(f)
Fig. 5. Translation of statements and expressions
4.2 Translation
We need two operations on program sets P . The first constructs a program that
non-deterministically executes one of the arguments. The second constructs all
programs that execute all arguments in some order.∑
P =
∑
{p1, . . . , pn} = p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pn∏
P =
{
p1; . . . ; p|P | | ∀i, j ≤ |P |. i 6= j → pi 6= pj ∧ pi, pj ∈ P
}
The translation has four phases: (i) provision of program variables, (ii) code
generation, (iii) generation of the safety condition, (iv) provision of ODEs and
constraints. We assume a fixed class C with some technical constraints: 1. If
a controller writes to an in-port method of another object, then it reads from
all out-port methods of the objects that occur in the precondition of that in-
port method. 2. Every duration statement has two identical parameters. 3. In-
port methods with a timed precondition are only called from timed controllers.
4. Local variable names are unique.
Program Variables. For each field, parameter, and local variable in C there is a
program variable with the same name. For each method m there is a time variable
tm ∈ Time, for each in-port method m a tick variable tickm ∈ Tick, both type
Real; tickm models the unknown time when an in-port method is called next.
Controller. The translation of ABS statements to hybrid programs is in Fig. 5.
We discuss the non-obvious rules: Calls to in-port methods of other objects are
mapped to ?true (i.e. skip), because there is no effect on the caller object. A read
from an out-port method is mapped to a non-deterministic assignment, such that
the read value adheres to the postcondition of the called out-port method. The
translation of an in-port or a controller has the form
if (check) then {exec; cleanup} (2)
– For a timed controller m with body await duration(e,e); s; this.m(), check
ensures that the correct duration passed and cleanup resets the clock:
check ≡ tm .= trans(e) exec ≡ trans(s) cleanup ≡ tm := 0
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– For a differential controller m with method body await diff e; s; this.m(),
check ensures the condition holds. No cleanup is needed:
check ≡ trans(e) exec ≡ trans(s) cleanup ≡?true
– For an in-port method m with method body this.f = v, precondition ϕ and
timed precondition ψ, check ensures the correct duration passed, exec chooses
non-deterministically a value consistent with ϕ, and cleanup does the same
for a new duration consistent with ψ (method name replaced by tickm):
check ≡ tm .= tickm exec ≡ f := ∗; ?ϕ
cleanup ≡ tickm := ∗; ?tickm > 0; ?ψ; tm := 0
Let M be the set of all translations of in-port methods and controllers, then:
codeC ≡
∑∏
M ;
(∑
M
)∗
(3)
The controller codeC first executes all controllers in a non-deterministically
chosen order, then allows each controller/in-port to be run again. The latter
replicates eager ABS behavior on satisfied guards: when a differential controller
is triggered and its guard still holds after its execution, then in ABS the controller
is run again. We do not translate out-port methods and the run method. Out-port
methods have no effect on an object state and their post-condition is guaranteed
at any point in time. The run method only sets the system up and guarantees
that every controller has the chance to run before the plant.
Precondition and Safety Condition. The preconditionC is C’s precondition pre
plus restrictions on the time and tick variables: in the beginning each clock starts
at zero and the tick variables have an unknown positive value. Additionally, all
initalizations of physical fields are added as equations. For example, Real r =
param + 2 results in r
.
= param + 2. The set of all such initializations is init.
preconditionC ≡ pre ∧
∧
t∈Time
t
.
= 0 ∧
∧
tick∈Tick
0 < tick ∧
∧
ϕ∈init
ϕ (4)
The safety condition is C’s invariant inv plus requires clauses of the used in-
port methods of other objects. Recall technical constraint 1 above. It ensures
that at the moment an in-port is called, the caller object has a correct copy
of the callee state. For a timed controller with guard duration(e,e), for each
called in-port method its timed precondition ϕ is added, but the method name
in ϕ replaced with trans(e). The set of modified preconditions is TReq′. Req′
are preconditions of used in-port methods of other classes than C, where the
parameter is replaced by the field passed to it. Ens′ are the postconditions of all
out-port methods of C, then:
safetyC ≡ inv ∧
∧
ψ∈Req′
ψ ∧
∧
ρ∈TReq′
ρ ∧
∧
θ∈Ens′
θ (5)
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Plant. The plant of a class C has the form
plantC ≡
∑
{(ode, odet & c) | c ∈ C} , (6)
where ode is the ODE from its physical block, odet describes the clock vari-
ables, and the constraints c ∈ C partition the domain of the physical fields.
The boundaries of the subdomains overlap exactly where the differential guards
hold.3 This models guards as events in dL, following the modeling pattern de-
scribed in Sect. 2. To ensure that no differential guard is omitted, it is necessary
that no two differential guards share a program variable. This is not a restriction,
because two controllers can be merged with a disjunction as in Expl. 1.
To define C let e1, . . . , em be the translations of differential guards in the
class and e˜i the weak complement of ei. Let t1, . . . , tl be all time variables intro-
duced for timed controllers with eti the expression in the duration statement. Let
pt1, . . . , ptk be all time variables introduced for in-port methods and tickpti the
associated tick variable. We set odet ≡ {t′1 = 1, . . . , t′l = 1, pt′1 = 1, . . . , pt′k = 1}
and define:
C ≡ ({e1, e˜1} × {e2, e˜2} × · · · × {em, e˜m})
∪ {t1 ≤ eti}i≤l ∪ {t1 ≥ eti}i≤l ∪ {pti ≤ tickpti}i≤n ∪ {pti ≥ tickpti}i≤n
Remark. Instead of using the parameter precondition one can verify one specific
object created in a main block with a precondition that characterizes it precisely.
— Our translation generates a few basic invariants for handling hybrid programs
of the form α∗. These include the safety condition, the fact that the inner loop in
code does not advance time, and information on fields with final values. These
invariants are usually not sufficient, but a starting point for manual specification.
Theorem 1. Let P be a set of classes. If for each C ∈ P the formula ϕC (1) is
valid, then for every main block that creates objects satisfying pre of C, in every
reachable state all objects satisfy inv of C.
The main observations behind this theorem are: 1. The dL program omits
no events, because each event is at a boundary of two evolution constraints
on a variable and no two events share a variable (each controller has its own
time variable); 2. the evolution constraints cover all possible states, so no run
is rejected, because the domain is too small; 3. each test in ϕC that discards
runs, does so using a condition that has been proven. For example, the test that
discards all runs of an in-port method for inputs not satisfying its precondition
is safe, because on the caller-side this condition is part of the safety condition.
The theorem also relies on technical constraint 1 above and the fact that the
recursive call is at the end of a controller which guarantee that at this moment
the caller copy of the callee’s state is consistent with the callee’s actual state.
3 Expressions contain only >=, <=, so weak complement ensures a boundary overlap.
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4.3 Case Study
We illustrate the HABS to KeYmaera X translation (introduced in Sect. 4.2
above) with the system in Fig. 4. All files and mechanical proofs, the transla-
tion and the simulator are available online under formbar.raillab.de/hybrid_
abs/. We first give the translation of the two-object water tank, whose behavior
for an initial level of 5 is shown on the left of Fig. 6.
Tank. The in-port method of the Tank class gives rise to a time variable tinDrain
and a tick variable tickinDrain. Following (4), preconditionTank is
4 < inVal < 9 ∧ tinDrain .= 0 ∧ 0 < tickinDrain ∧ level .= inVal ∧ drain .= −
1
2
The safety condition says the tank level stays in its limits and that outLevel
adheres to its contract which happen to be identical. No in-port methods of
other classes are used, hence:
safetyTank ≡ 3 ≤ level ≤ 10
The Tank class has no controller method, so only the inDrain method needs
to be translated and we set codeTank ≡ p(p)∗ where p ≡ trans(inDrain), see (2):
p ≡ if (tinDrain .= tickinDrain) then
drain := ∗;
?−1
2
≤ drain ≤ 1
2
∧ (drain < 0→ level ≥ 3.5) ∧ (drain > 0→ level ≤ 9.5);
tickinDrain := ∗; ?tickinDrain > 0; ?tickinDrain < 1; tinDrain := 0
Our implementation attempts to generate useful invariants. For the example it
proposes safetyTank∧old(inVal) .= inVal as a loop invariant for (p)∗. The second
conjunct is justified, because field inVal is not reassigned. The old function yields
the value of its argument before the loop iteration. We do not attempt to vali-
date the invariant, it serves barely as a starting point for the interactive proof.
Obviously, codeTank can be simplified to p, so an invariant is not necessary.
The plant (6) is based on the physical block and the new clock variable (there
are no differential guards), with the evolution constraint split along the new time
variable tinDrain. ODEs of the form v
′ = 0 are default and omitted.
plantTank ≡ ({level′ = drain, t′inDrain = 1 & tinDrain ≤ tickinDrain}) +
({level′ = drain, t′inDrain = 1 & tinDrain ≥ tickinDrain})
Timed Controller. The precondition (4) and plant (6) of FlowCtrl are straight-
forward. The latter is defined, even though the physical block is not present.
preconditionFlowCtrl ≡ 0 < tick < 1
plantFlowCtrl ≡ ({t′ctrlFlow = 1 & tctrlFlow ≥ tick}) +
({t′ctrlFlow ≡ 1 & (tctrlFlow ≤ tick})
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The safety condition (5) is the timed precondition of the called inDrain
method and the class invariant (subsumed by the precondition of inDrain):
safetyFlowCtrl ≡
−1
2
≤ drain ≤ 1
2
∧ tick < 1 ∧ (drain < 0→ level ≥ 3.5) ∧ (drain > 0→ level ≤ 9.5)
Finally, the code codeFlowCtrl is defined as q(q)
∗ with
q ≡ if (tctrlFlow .= tick) then
level := ∗; ?3 ≤ level ≤ 10; if (level ≤ 3.5) then {drain := 1
2
};
if (level ≥ 9.5) then {drain :=−1
2
}; tctrlFlow := 0
Differential Controller. We give the translation of the tank CSingleTank from
Fig. 2 to illustrate the handling of differential controllers. Its precondition and
safety condition are again straightforward:
preconditionCSingleTank ≡ 4 < inVal < 9
safetyCSingleTank ≡ 3 ≤ level ≤ 10
The plant and code interact. The plant separates the evolution domain into
two parts, with the guard of the differential controller (the white areas in Fig. 6)
defining their boundary. The gray areas are larger than the safe region defined
by 3 <= level <= 10. This is necessary: If we used simply the complement of
the safe region level <= 3 | level >= 10 as a guard and are in a program state
at the boundary (the lower of the states indicated with a star on the right in
Fig. 6), then the controller changes the state as shown by the arrow. But if the
next state is on the boundary, then the guard is triggered, the controller runs
again, and so on, without physical time being able to advance. The guard in
Fig. 2 ensures that after the controller has run, the state is not on the boundary
anymore. This behavior is visualized by our implementation, see the right part of
Fig. 2. The code has the form codeCSingleTank ≡ r(r)∗, with r defined as follows:
r ≡ if (level ≤ 3 ∧ drain ≤ 0) ∨ (level ≥ 10 ∧ drain ≥ 0) then
if (level ≤ 3) then drain := 1
2
else drain :=−1
2
plantCSingleTank ≡
({level′ = drain& (level ≤ 3 ∧ drain ≤ 0) ∨ (level ≥ 10 ∧ drain ≥ 0)}) +
({level′ = drain& (level ≥ 3 ∧ drain ≤ 0) ∨ (level ≤ 10 ∧ drain ≥ 0)})
5 Simulation
The implementation of HABS is based on the ABS compiler [32], can also be
used stand-alone, and is not subject to the restrictions imposed for translation to
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level
dr
ain
3        10
Fig. 6. Simulation of the two-object tank (l.) and events in the single-object tank (r.).
dL given in Fig. 3. It allows unrestricted use of differential guards and includes
ABS features such as synchronization via futures, a module system, product
lines, and abstract data types.
The ODEs of a class cannot be changed at runtime and are represented as
a string in the class table. To compile differential guards correctly one needs to
compute mteFσ (diff e) (Def. 2). To compute F , the ODEs and the current state
of the physical fields are passed to Maxima [23] as an initial value problem. The
solution is an equation system or an error. Currently, the simulator does not
support non-unique solutions or non-solvable ODEs.
Afterwards, Maxima is invoked again, this time with a minimalization prob-
lem: it minimizes the time t with the equation system representing F as the con-
straints. The result is then handled in the same way as a parameter to a timed
guard by the runtime system. Once time has passed and the suspended process
is reactivated, the physical fields are updated according to F . To implement the
time advance function adv , if the state of the object changes any physical field,
the above procedure is executed again for every currently suspended differential
guard to accommodate the result.
The output files used to visualize a program execution are of the form t1, F1,
t1, F2, t2, . . . , Fn, tn. Here ti are the points in time where the object schedules
a process and Fi the function describing its physical behavior in the previous
suspended state. Each time a differential guard is reactivated, not only its state
is updated, but the solution Fi+1 and the reactivation time ti+1 are written
to the output. Each object has its own output file. A Python script translates
output files into a discrete dynamic graph in Maxima format which in turn calls
gnuplot that is responsible for creating the graph. The output of one object is
shown in Fig. 2 and an overlay of two objects in Fig. 6. The latter shows how
the state of the discrete controller lags behind the physical state of the tank.
6 Related & Future Work, Conclusion
Related Work. Recent efforts [25,22] introduce component-based modeling and
verification techniques for hybrid systems in dL to split the verification task
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into manageable pieces. Integrated tools such as Ptolemy [31] emphasize timing
aspects, signals, and data flow between heterogeneous models and their simula-
tion. Our work complements these efforts with user-friendly modeling constructs
in a uniform modeling language, validation by simulation, and modular formal
verification along system aspects through translation from HABS to dL.
Translation between languages for hybrid systems so far is centered on hybrid
automata as a unifying notation [5,4]. Others focus on the discrete fragment [14].
Our translation from HABS to dL translates full hybrid systems models written
in a programming language, including annotations (e.g., starting and invariant
conditions); it is soundly based on the formal semantics of HABS and dL.
Hybrid systems validation through simulation is approached with translation
to Stateflow/Simulink [3]; with a combination of discrete-event and numerical
methods [9]; with threat models for security analyses [20]; and with co-simulation
between control software and dedicated physics simulators [33,10]. Here, we fo-
cus on safety verification, the distributed aspect of HABS models, and take a
pragmatic first step for simulating continuous models.
Hybrid Rebeca [16] proposes to embed hybrid automata directly into the
actor language Rebeca. In contrast to HABS, no simulation is available and
verification is not object-modular, because the whole model is translated into a
single hybrid automaton. Because of this, a number of boundedness constraints
have to be imposed. The verification backend of Hybrid Rebeca does not support
non-linear ODEs (our examples are linear, but HABS, KeYmaera X, and Max-
ima, support non-linear ODEs; HABS models with non-linear ODEs are found
in the online supplement). Hybrid automata can be encoded in HABS, see Fig. 2.
Only one model [19] uses Active Objects for a cyber-physical system, with
the larger part of the model simulating the differential guards introduced here.
Future Work. We plan to extend the verification backend to more liberal differ-
ential guards and fields. We want to integrate the verification of hybrid properties
described here with the verification of computation-heavy Active Objects, as im-
plemented in the KeY-ABS tool [12]. We also plan to implement approximating
the simulation of non-solvable ODEs and to perform a large case study.
Conclusion. Concurrent hybrid systems are not only difficult to verify formally,
it is equally hard to validate a formal model of them. Both activities have conflict-
ing demands, so we propose a translation-based approach: modeling is guided
by patterns over hybrid programs and class specifications in HABS, a hybrid
extension of the concurrent AO language ABS. These are automatically decom-
posed and translated in a semantics-preserving manner (Thm. 1) into sequential
proof obligations of the verification-oriented differential dynamic logic dL and
discharged by the hybrid theorem prover KeYmaera X. We illustrated the vi-
ability of our approach by two case studies that feature many complications:
concurrent behavior, possible non-termination, correctness depending on tim-
ing constants, multi-dimensional domain, time lag in sensing, etc. Asynchronous
method calls and differential guards keep the hybrid AO models succinct and
intuitive, while simulation and visualization support their validation.
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Syntactic categories.
C, I,m in Name
g in Guard
s in Stmt
a in Annotation
Definitions.
IF ::= interface I { [Sg] }
CL ::= [[a]] classC [(T x)] [implements I] { [T x; ]M}
Sg ::= T m ([T x])
M ::= [[a]] Sg {[T x; ] s }
a ::= Deadline: d | Cost: d | Critical: b | Scheduler : e | a, a
g ::= b | x? | duration(d, d) | g ∧ g
s ::= s; s | skip | if b { s } [ else { s }] | while b { s } | return e
| [[a]] x = rhs | suspend | await g | duration(d, d)
rhs ::= e | new C (e) | e.get | o!m(e)
Fig. 7. Syntax for the concurrent object level.
e ::= case2 v {br} | . . . v ::= o | f | . . .
s ::= duration2(d1, d2) | . . .
cn ::=  | obj |msg | fut | cn cn tcn ::= cn clock(t)
fut ::= f | fut(f, v) σ ::= x 7→ v | σ ◦ σ
obj ::= ob(o, e, σ, pr, q) pr ::= {σ|s} | idle
msg ::= m(o, v, f, d, c, t) q ::=  | pr | q ◦ q
Fig. 8. Runtime syntax; here, o and f are object and future identifiers, d and c are the
deadline and cost annotations.
For convenience, we give the semantics of Timed ABS here. The content of
this section is a reproduction of Section 4 in [6], with kind permission of the
authors.
A Semantics
Fig. 7 gives the object layer of Timed ABS, which is extended in Fig. 8 to the
runtime syntax.
Configurations cn are sets of objects, invocation messages, and futures. A
timed configuration tcn adds a global clock clock(t) to a configuration (where t
is a value of type Time). The global clock is used to record arrival and finishing
times for processes. Timed configurations live inside curly brackets; thus, in {cn},
cn captures the entire runtime configuration of the system. The associative and
commutative union operator on (timed) configurations is denoted by whitespace
and the empty configuration by ε.
An object obj is a term ob(o, e, σ, pr, q) where o is the object’s identifier, e is
an expression of type Process representing a scheduling policy, σ a substitution
representing the object’s fields, pr is an (active) process, and q a pool of processes.
A substitution σ is a mapping from variable names x to values v. For substitutions
and process pools, concatenation is denoted by σ1 ◦ σ2 and q1 ◦ q2, respectively.
In an invocation message m(o, v, f, d, c, t), m is the method name, o the
callee, v the call’s actual parameter values, f the future to which the call’s
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[[b]]σ = b
[[x]]σ = σ(x)
[[v]]σ = v
[[Co(e)]]σ = Co([[e]]σ)
[[deadline]]σ = σ(deadline)
[[fn(e)]]σ =
{
[[efn ]]x7→v if e = v
[[fn([[e]]σ)]]σ otherwise
[[case e {br}]]σ = [[case2 [[e]]σ {br}]]σ
[[case2 t {p⇒ e; br}]]σ =
{
[[e]]σ◦match(p,t) if match(p, t) 6= ⊥
[[case2 t {br}]]σ otherwise
Fig. 9. The evaluation of functional expressions.
result is returned, d and c are the provided deadline and cost of the call, and t is
a time stamp recording the time of the call. A future is either an identifier f or
a term fut(f, v) with an identifier f and a reply value v. For simplicity, classes
are not represented explicitly in the semantics, but may be seen as static tables
of object layout and method definitions.
Processes and Process Lifting. A process {σ|s} consists of a substitution σ of
local variable bindings and a list s of statements, or it is idle. By default, the local
variables of a process include the variables method of type String, arrival of type
Time, cost of type Duration, deadline of type Duration, start of type Time,
finish of type Time, critical of type Bool, value of type Int, and destiny
of type Name. Consequently, we can define a function lift which transforms the
runtime representation of a process into the Timed ABS datatype of processes
and a function select which returns the process corresponding to a given process
identifier in a process queue, as follows:
lift({σ|s}) = Proc(σ(destiny), σ(method), σ(arrival),
σ(cost), σ(deadline), σ(start), σ(finish),
σ(crit), σ(value))
select(pid, ε) = idle
select(pid, {σ|s} ◦ q) =
{
{σ|s} if σ(destiny) = pid
select(pid, q) otherwise
The value of destiny is guaranteed to be unique, and is used to identify processes
at the Timed ABS level.
A.1 A Reduction System for Expressions
The strict evaluation [[e]]σ of functional expressions e, given in Fig. 9, is defined
inductively over the data types of the functional language and is mostly standard,
hence this subsection only contains brief remarks about some of the expressions.
Let σ be a substitution which binds the name deadline to a duration value. For
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every (user-defined) function definition
def T fn(T x) = efn ,
the evaluation of a function call [[fn(e)]]σ reduces to the evaluation of the corre-
sponding expression [[efn ]]x 7→v when the arguments e have already been reduced
to ground terms v. (Note the change in scope. Since functions are defined inde-
pendently of the context where they are used, we here assume that the expression
e does not contain free variables and the substitution σ does not apply in the
evaluation of e.) In the case of pattern matching, variables in the pattern p may
be bound to argument values in v. Thus the substitution context for evaluat-
ing the right hand side e of the branch p ⇒ e extends the current substitution
σ with bindings that occurred during the pattern matching. Let the function
match(p, v) return a substitution σ such that σ(p) = v (if there is no match,
match(p, v) = ⊥).
A.2 A Transition System for Timed Configurations
Evaluating Guards. Given a substitution σ and a configuration cn, we lift the
evaluation function for functional expressions and denote by [[g]]cnσ a evaluation
function which reduces guards g to data values (the state configuration is needed
to evaluate future variables). Let [[g1 ∧ g2]]cnσ = [[g1]]cnσ ∧[[g2]]cnσ , [[duration(b, w)]]cnσ =
[[b]]σ ≤ 0, [[x?]]cnσ = true if [[x]]σ = f and fut(f, v) ∈ cn for some value v (otherwise
f ∈ cn and we let [[x?]]cnσ = false), and [[b]]cnσ = [[b]]σ.
Auxiliary functions. If T is the return type of a method m in a class C, we
let bind(m, o, v, f, d, b, t) return a process resulting from the activation of m in
the class of o with actual parameters v, callee o, associated future f , deadline d,
and criticality b at time t. If binding succeeds, this process has a local variable
destiny of type fut〈T 〉 bound to f , the method’s formal parameters are bound
to v, and the reserved variables deadline and critical are bound to d and b,
respectively. Furthermore, arrival is bound to t and cost to [[e]]x 7→v (or to the
default 0 if no annotation is provided for the method). The function atts(C, v, o)
returns the initial state of an instance of class C, in which the formal parameters
are bound to v and the reserved variables this is bound to the object identity
o. The function init(C) returns an activation of the init method of C, if defined.
Otherwise it returns the idle process. The predicate fresh(n) asserts that a name
n is globally unique (where n may be an identifier for an object or a future).
Transition rules transform state configurations into new configurations, and
are given in Fig. 10. We denote by a the substitution which represents the
attributes of an object and by l the substitution which represents the local
variable bindings of a process. In the semantics, different assignment rules are
defined for side effect free expressions (Assign1 and Assign2), object creation
(New-Object), method calls (Async-Call), and future dereferencing (Read-Fut).
Rule Skip consumes a skip in the active process. Here and in the sequel, the
variable s will match any (possibly empty) statement list. We denote by idle
a process with an empty statement list. Rules Assign1 and Assign2 assign the
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(Skip)
ob(o, p, a, {l | skip; s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l | s}, q)
(Assign1)
x ∈ dom(l)
ob(o, p, a, {l | x = e; s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l[x 7→ [[e]]a◦l] | s}, q)
(Assign2)
x 6∈ dom(l)
ob(o, p, a, {l | x = e; s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a[x 7→ [[e]]a◦l], {l | s}, q)
(Suspend)
ob(o, p, a, {l | suspend; s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, idle, {l | s} ◦ q)
(Await1)
[[e]]cna◦l
{ob(o, p, a, {l | await e; s}, q) cn}
→ {ob(o, p, a, {l | s}, q) cn}
(Await2)
¬[[e]]cna◦l
{ob(o, p, a, {l | await e; s}, q) cn}
→ {ob(o, p, a, {l | suspend; await e; s}, q) cn}
(Schedule)
q′ = ready(q, a, cn) pr = select(pid, q)
q′ 6= ∅ pid = [[procid(p)]]a[queue7→liftall(q′)]
{ob(o, p, a, idle, q) cn}
→ {ob(o, p, a, pr, (q \ pr)) cn}
(Activation)
q′ = bind(m, o, v¯, f, d, b, t) ◦ q
ob(o, p, a, pr, q)
m(o, v¯, f, d, b, t)
→ ob(o, p, a, pr, q′)
(New-Object)
an = Scheduler: p′ fresh(o′)
pr = init(C) a′ = atts(C, [[e]]a◦l, o′, c)
ob(o, p, a, {l|[an] x = new C(e); s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l|x = o′; s}, q)
ob(o′, p′, a′, pr, ∅)
(Tick)
0 < d ≤ mte(cn)
{cn} → {adv(cn, d)}
(Duration1)
d1 = [[e1]]a◦l d2 = [[e2]]a◦l
ob(o, p, a, {l | duration(e1, e2); s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l | duration2(d1, d2); s}, q)
(Duration2)
d1 ≤ 0
ob(o, p, a, {l | duration2(d1, d2); s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l | s}, q)
(Async-Call)
fresh(f) an = Deadline: d, Critical: b
ob(o, p, a, {l | [an] x := e!m(e); s}, q) clock(t)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l | x := f); s}, q) clock(t)
m([[e]]a◦l, [[e]]a◦l, f, d, b, t) f
(Return)
f = l(destiny)
ob(o, p, a, {l | return(e); s}, q) clock(t) f
→ ob(o, p, a, {l | finish = t}, q) clock(t) fut(f, [[e]]a◦l)
(Read-Fut)
f = [[e]]a◦l
ob(o, p, a, {l | x = e.get; s}, q) fut(f, v)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l | x = v; s}, q) fut(f, v)
(Cond1)
[[e]]a◦l
ob(o, p, a, {l|if e {s1} else {s2}; s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l|s1; s}, q)
(Cond2)
¬[[e]]a◦l
ob(o, p, a, {l|if e {s1} else {s2}; s}, q)
→ ob(o, p, a, {l|s2; s}, q)
Fig. 10. The semantics of Timed ABS.
value of expression e to a variable x in the local variables l or in the fields a,
respectively. Rules Cond1 and Cond2 cover the two cases of conditional state-
ments in the same way. (We omit the rule for while-loops which unfolds into
the conditional.)
Scheduling. Two operations manipulate a process pool q; pr◦q adds a process
pr to q and q \pr removes pr from q. If q is a pool of processes, σ a substitution,
t a time value, and cn a configuration, we denote by ready(q, σ, cn) the subset
of processes from q which are ready to execute (in the sense that the processes
will not directly suspend or block the object).
Scheduling is captured by the rule Schedule, which applies when the ac-
tive process is idle and schedules a new process for execution if there are ready
processes in the process pool q. We utilize a scheduling policy in an object
ob(o, p, σ, idle, q), p is an expression representing the user-defined scheduling pol-
icy. This policy selects the process to be scheduled among the ready processes
of the pool q.
In order to apply the scheduling policy p, which is defined for the datatype
Process in Timed ABS, to the runtime representation q of the process pool, we
lift the processes in q to values of type Process. Let the function liftall recursively
transform a pool q of processes to a value of type List〈Process〉 by repeatedly
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applying lift to the processes in q. The process identifier of the scheduled process
is used to select the runtime representation of this process from q.
Note that in order to evaluate guards on futures, the configuration cn is
passed to the ready function. This explains the use of brackets in the rules,
which ensures that cn is bound to the rest of the global system configuration.
The same approach is used to evaluate guards in the rules Await1 and Await2
below.
Rule Suspend suspends the active process to the process pool, leaving the
active process idle. Rule Await1 consumes the await g statement if g evaluates
to true in the current state of the object, rule Await2 adds a suspend statement
in order to suspend the process if the guard evaluates to false.
In rule Activation the function bind(m, o, v¯, f, d, c, b, t) binds a method call
to object o in the class of o. This results in a new process {l|s} which is placed in
the queue, where l(destiny) = f , l(method) = m, l(arrival) = t, l(cost) = c,
l(deadline) = d, l(start) = 0, l(finish) = 0, l(crit) = b, l(value) = 0, and
where the formal parameters of m are bound to v.
Durations. A statement duration(e1, e2) is reduced to the runtime statement
duration2(d1, d2), in which the expressions e1 and e2 have been reduced to
duration values. This statement blocks execution on the object until the best
case execution time has passed; i.e., until at least the duration d1 has passed.
Remark that time cannot pass beyond duration d2 before the statement has been
executed (see below).
Method Calls. Rule Async-Call sends an invocation message to [[e]]a◦l with
the unique identity f of a new future (since fresh(f)), the method name m, and
parameter values v. The identifier of the new future is placed in the configu-
ration, and is bound to a return value in Return. The annotations are used
to provide a deadline and a criticality which are passed to the callee with the
invocation message. (The global clock provides a time stamp for the call.) Rule
Return places the evaluated return expression in the future associated with the
destiny variable of the process, and ends execution after recording the time of
process completion in the finish variable. Rule Read-Fut dereferences the fu-
ture fut(f, v). Note that if the future lacks a return value, the reduction in this
object is blocked.
Object creation. Rule New-Object creates a new object with a unique iden-
tifier o′. The object’s fields are given default values by atts(C, [[e]]a◦l, o′, c), ex-
tended with the actual values e for the class parameters (evaluated in the context
of the creating process) and o′ for this. In order to instantiate the remaining
attributes, the process pr is active (we assume that this process reduces to idle
if init(C) is unspecified in the class definition, and that it asynchronously calls
run if the latter is specified). The object gets the scheduler in the annotation
an (which is copied from the class or system default if a scheduler annotation is
not provided).
Time advance. Rule Tick specifies how time can advance in the system.
We adapt the approach of Real-Time Maude to Timed ABS and specify a global
time which advances uniformly throughout the global configuration cn, combined
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mte(cn1 cn2) = min(mte(cn1),mte(cn2))
mte(ob(o, p, a, pr, q)) =
{
mte(pr) if pr 6= idle
mte(q) if pr = idle
mte(q1, q2) = min(mte(q1),mte(q2))
mte({l|s}) =

w if s = duration2(b, w); s2
mte(g) if s = await g; s2
0 if s is enabled
∞ otherwise
mte(g) =

max(mte(g1),mte(g2)) if g = g1 ∧ g2
w if g = duration(b, w)
0 if g evaluates to true
∞ otherwise
adv(cn1 cn2, d) = adv(c1, d) adv(c2, d)
adv(ob(o, p, a, pr, q), d) = ob(o, p, a, adv(pr, d), adv(q, d))
adv((q1, q2), d) = adv(q1, d), adv(q2, d)
adv({l|s}, d) = {l[deadline 7→ l(deadline)− d]|adv(s, d)}
adv(s, d) =

duration2(b− d,w − d) if s = duration2(b, w)
await adv(g, d) if s = await g
adv(s1, d) if s = s1; s2
s otherwise
adv(g, d) =

adv(g1, d) ∧ adv(g2, d) if g = g1 ∧ g2
duration(b− d,w − d) if g = duration(b, w)
g otherwise
Fig. 11. Functions controlling the advancement of time. Trivial cases for terms msg,
fut have been omitted.
with two auxiliary functions: adv(cn, d) specifies how the advance of time with a
duration d affects different parts of the configuration cn, and mte(cn) defines the
maximum amount that global time can advance. At any time, the system can
advance by a duration d ≤ mte(cn). However, we are not interested in advancing
time by a duration 0, which would leave the system in the same state.
The auxiliary functions adv and mte are defined in Fig. 11. Both have the
whole configuration as input but consider mainly objects since these exhibit
time-dependent behavior. The function mte calculates the maximum time in-
crement such that no “interesting” occurrence (i.e., worst-case duration expires,
duration guard passes) will be missed in any object. Observe that for statements
which are not time-dependent, the maximum time elapse is 0 if the statement
is enabled, since these statements are instantaneous, and infinite if not enabled,
since time may pass when the object is blocked. Hence, mte returns the mini-
mum time increment that lets an object become “unstuck”, either by letting its
active process continue or enabling one of its suspended processes. The function
adv updates the active and suspended processes of all objects, decrementing all
deadline values as well as the values in duration statements and duration
guards at the head of the statement list in processes.
